The Significance of Banal Things: A Reply to Makky by Acil, Tufan
105Vol. 9/22020
The Significance of Banal Things: 
A Reply to Makky
Tufan Acil
This short paper comments on Lukáš Makky’s article What Makes Things Banal The argument is divided 
into two sections. The first section reconstructs Makky’s understanding of banality, which he develops 
based on aesthetic theories by Wolfgang Welsch and Walter Benjamin. The second and more critical 
section examines the validity of the arguments Makky uses for his definition of banality. Although this 
commentary attaches great value to Makky’s  insightful analysis of the term banality and agrees with 
identifying it as a historical and processual concept, drawing on writings by M. Heidegger and J. Derrida 
it eventually proposes a different understanding of the relationship between the arts and banal things 
and underlines the importance of banality for the creation and perception of the arts.  |  Keywords: 
Banality, Authenticity, Aura, Perception, Repetition
Lukáš Makky’s  paper What Makes Things Banal (2020) tackles the question of 
why some things, activities, and phenomena in daily life and also in the arts 
are banal or are meant to be banal. The author mainly argues that banal things 
remain the most insignificant aspects of reality that we rarely reciprocate. The 
text begins with the justification of the necessity and importance of scientific 
research on banality despite the fact that banal phenomena and activities 
(supposedly) constitute only ‘minor details’ in our daily life. For Makky, the 
research on banality should methodically focus on the underlying reasons and 
conditions of banal things and activities in daily life and aesthetics. These are 
indeed not intended to be created as ‘banal’ from the outset, but rather 
gradually become banal or are banalized under different social, cultural, or 
political circumstances. The main purpose of the paper is therefore to 
demonstrate how banal things get different from other things and facts in daily 
life and aesthetics. 
Makky argues that the banality of things should originate either in relation to 
our perception, that is, in our aesthetic (im)perception, or in the fact that these 
things themselves lack something. He explains the first part of this two-sided 
hypothesis by referring to the notion of anaesthesis, which was systematically 
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developed by Wolfgang Welsch (Ästhetisches Denken, 1990). In the light of 
Welsch’s well-known concept of anaesthetization and its dialectic relationship 
with the aestheticization process of modernity, Makky makes it plausible that 
banal things or phenomena should be directly connected with anaesthetic 
phenomena. According to Welsch, the infinite number of aesthetic inputs that 
recipients have been used to experience in the last century are pushed out on 
the periphery of aesthetic interest, so  they become imperceptible and do  not 
cause any mental or perceptual motions in us anymore. Consequently, Makky 
concludes that this process characterizes the nature of banal objects and 
activities. They also lack perceptibility and are merely ignored by the recipient.
Makky develops the second part of his hypothesis with regard to the concept of 
‘aura’ which was introduced by Walter Benjamin as the essence of fine art. The 
concept of the aura is interpreted as "inner energy, a power that preserves an 
artwork’s  uniqueness and irreplaceability and assures its specific place in 
history and culture". (Makky, 2020, p. 98) As in the case of anaesthetic 
phenomena, the author uses once again this notion ex negativo in order to 
define banality: Aura is for Makky in an axiological sense the exact opposite of 
banality because banal things lack the unique space and time that would 
guarantee their authenticity. In opposition to the notion of aura, the process of 
banalization or that of creating banal actions originates in the reproducibility 
and repetition in time and space.  
It is important to note that Makky’s  two-sided hypothesis, which has been 
briefly introduced so  far, does not aim to offer two different theories of 
banality, but one in which these two sides are internally related and 
complementary to each other. The author starts consistently with 
Welsch’s concept of anaesthetization of daily life in order to demonstrate that 
banal objects are aesthetically inaccessible to us and they are not seen or 
perceived. In the subsequent step, he shows that the reason why banal objects 
are overlooked by the recipient is directly linked to their negative property, 
which is imperceptibility. Since banal things lack authenticity and uniqueness 
in time and space, they do  not offer anything special to our perception; 
therefore, they are not perceived and are merely ignored. 
Concerning the arguments presented above, one should first of all examine if 
the author really answers his own question What Makes Things Banal, which 
appears in the title of the paper. The hypothesis on banality that Makky tries to 
construct by referring to Welsch’s and Benjamin’s aesthetics does not directly 
demonstrate what banality is, but mainly what it lacks. Banal objects lack the 
quality of being perceptible, lack authenticity, uniqueness, and so  on. It is 
certain that Makky’s  ontological approach makes a  solid distinction between 
banal objects and other objects of daily life. However, the essential question on 
what banality has at its disposal still requires further research. At the end of 
the paper, Makky attempts to define banality also in terms of the property of 
being repeatable and reproducible. But here one should admit that not all 
reproducible objects, let us think for example ‘books’, are banal objects per se 
only because they are materially reproduced.       
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Secondly, the negative characterization of banality, as opposed to aesthetic 
perception and works of art, should be examined in a more detailed way. If we 
define banality with respect to the concept of reproducibility and repetition, 
then we should further clarify how it contradicts with art and with individual 
works of art.  Isn’t it the case that the arts permanently repeat or make 
recurrent use of the same or similar artistic forms from the art tradition? As 
Jacques Derrida would critically remark on this point (Derrida, 1978), it is 
impossible to imagine a work of art that has no reference to any other forms, 
styles, or subjects in the art tradition. Works of art need necessarily to be 
variously connected with (pre)existing works of arts and especially with artistic 
genres, otherwise one would never recognize them as works of art in the first 
place (Derrida, 1980). If we consider different aesthetic or artistic movements 
in the art tradition, we can easily realize that an endless number of individual 
and authentic works of art continuously repeat and recreate pre-existing 
forms. For example, impressionism can only be acknowledged as an art 
movement insofar as the works of different artists repeat similar forms such as 
the depiction of emotions and representation of ‘the moment’. Thus, it is clear 
that the arts depend on repetitive forms, continuous recreation of the old 
forms and styles through new instruments and media. If we agree with the 
author that repetition and reproduction contribute to the process of 
banalization in a  general sense, then repetitive motifs and forms in the art 
should also be considered banal. Therefore, one could finally ask: Is it possible 
to omit banality entirely from the arts? Can art gain the special status of being 
completely independent of banality?  
Thirdly, it is necessary to consider that the relationship between the arts and 
banality is different from mere opposition. Given the fact that we are 
continuously surrounded by banal activities and objects, as the author well 
explicates, we should ask what arts can teach us about the banal reality of our 
times, so that this reality might gradually become less banal and banal objects 
might also acquire some meaning for us. Makky refers at the beginning of his 
text to an author, Martin Heidegger, whose aesthetic theory could offer 
a different understanding of the relationship between banal objects and works 
of art.  In his famous essay The Origin of the Work of Art (1960), Heidegger 
discusses how art provides a  basic understanding of ourselves and our 
relationship with the world that we cannot obtain in any other way. His well-
known analysis of A  Pair of Peasant Shoes by Van Gogh results in an 
understanding of the real essence and the truth of these pair of shoes (or banal 
things) as ‘reliability’ (Ger. Verlässlichkeit) in daily life. In other words, art 
reveals the underlying functions and truth of banal things and objects. Without 
art, and living only within the realm of banal objects, we would continue to 
ignore the underlying meaning of such objects’ existence and could never gain 
true knowledge about their essence and real function. In a continuous relation 
with banal objects and acts, art does not only manifest their intern reality but 
also gradually takes out or eliminate their banality for the recipient. Finally, its 
effect goes beyond the sphere of aesthetics and helps the recipient perceive 
these objects less banal also in their daily life.  
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